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ABSTRACT		
Agricultural	and	reproductive	technologies	ostensibly	represent	opposing	poles	within	
discourses	on	population	growth:	one	aims	to	‘feed	the	world,’	while	the	other	seeks	to	limit	
the	number	of	mouths	there	are	to	feed.	There	is,	however,	an	urgent	need	to	critically	
interrogate	new	discourses	linking	population	size	with	climate	change	and	promoting	
agricultural	and	reproductive	technologies	as	a	means	to	address	associated	problems.	This	
article	analyses	the	specific	discourses	produced	by	the	Bill	and	Melinda	Gates	Foundation	
(BMGF)	in	relation	to	these	‘population	technologies’	and	‘climate-smart’	agriculture	in	
particular.	Drawing	on	concepts	and	approaches	developed	by	Black,	postcolonial	and	Marxist	
feminists	including	intersectionality,	racial	capitalism,	social	reproduction,	and	reproductive	and	
environmental	justice,	we	explore	how	within	these	discourses,	the	‘geo-populationism’	of	the	
BMGF’s	climate-	smart	agriculture	initiatives,	like	the	‘demo-populationism’	of	its	family	
planning	interventions,	mobilises	neoliberal	notions	of	empowerment,	productivity	and	
innovation.	Not	only	do	these	populationist	discourses	reinforce	neoliberal	framings	and	
policies	which	extend	existing	regimes	of	racialised	and	gendered	socio-spatial	inequality,	but	
they	also	underwrite	global	capital	accumulation	through	new	science	and	technologies.	The	
BMGF’s	representations	of	its	climate-smart	agriculture	initiatives	offer	the	opportunity	to	
understand	how	threats	of	climate	change	are	mobilised	to	reanimate	and	repackage	the	
Malthusian	disequilibrium	between	human	fertility	and	agricultural	productivity.	Drawing	upon	
our	readings	of	these	discourses,	we	critically	propose	the	concept	of	‘necro-populationism’	to	
refer	to	processes	that	target	racialised	and	gendered	populations	for	dispossession,	
toxification,	slow	death	and	embodied	violence,	even	while	direct	accountability	for	the	effects	
of	these	changes	is	dispersed.	We	also	identify	a	need	for	further	research	which	will	not	only	
trace	the	ways	in	which	the	BMGF’s	global	policies	are	materialised,	spatialised,	reproduced	
and	reoriented	by	multiple	actors	in	local	contexts,	but	will	also	recognise	and	affirm	the	
diverse	forms	through	which	these	‘necro-populationist’	processes	are	disavowed	and	resisted.	
	
Introduction		
Reproductive	and	agricultural	technologies	ostensibly	represent	opposing	poles	within	
discourses	on	population	growth:	one	aims	to	‘feed	the	world,’	while	the	other	seeks	to	limit	
the	number	of	mouths	there	are	to	feed.	The	linking	of	these	concerns	has	a	long	history	within	
economic	and	social	thought,	epitomized	by	the	work	of	Thomas	Malthus	who	viewed	this	
relationship	as	a	fundamental	disequilibrium	leading	toward	crisis	(Malthus	1798).	This	idea	
that	population	growth	will	consistently	outpace	agricultural	productivity	was	extensively	
reproduced	within	dominant	strands	of	20
th	century	environmental	thinking	(for	example,	
Hardin	1968;	Ehrlich	1968).		
Currently,	responses	to	climate	change	from	development	actors	are	reanimating	some	
of	these	(neo)Malthusian	framings	by	suggesting	that	the	combination	of	growing	global	
populations	and	an	increasingly	agriculture-	adverse	climate	represents	the	principal	threat	to	
‘development’	(FAO	2013;	IFAD	2011).	In	particular,	the	interventions	of	the	Bill	and	Melinda	
Gates	Foundation	(BMGF)	relating	to	both	variables	in	Malthus’	original	population	equilibrium	
-	human	fertility	and	agricultural	production	-	have	been	highly	influential.	These	are	framed	as	
initiatives	to	‘teach	farmers	how	to	increase	production	sustainably’	and	‘help	women	make	
informed	family-planning	decisions’	(Gates	Foundation,	‘What	we	do’,	n.d.)	within	the	context	
of	an	overall	mission	to	‘empower	the	poorest,	especially	women	and	girls,	to	transform	their	
lives’	(ibid.).		
In	this	article,	we	consider	the	role	of	the	BMGF’s	public-facing	materials.	We	argue	that	
these	promote	the	acceptance	of	dangerous	and	uncertain	fertility	management	(Hendrixson	
2018;	Bendix	et	al.,	2019)	and	Green	Revolution	technologies	(Eddens	2017;	Serrano	2018;	
Lapegna	2014;	Otero	and	Lapegna	2016;	Motta	2016;	Leguizamón	2016;	Caceres	2015)	and	
seek	to	legitimise	the	notion	that	behavioural	interventions	are	necessary	and	justified	in	order	
to	produce	consumers	of	these	new	technologies.	We	do	not	seek	here	to	provide	a	
geographically	differentiated	overview	or	historical	analysis	of	the	Foundation’s	activities.	
Rather,	the	article	aims	to	draw	attention	to	how	Malthusian	discourses	which	posit	a	
disequilibrium	between	human	fertility	and	agricultural	production	are	taking	on	contemporary	
forms	in	the	context	of	climate	change.	We	have	focused	on	the	discourse	produced	by	the	Bill	
and	Melinda	Gates	Foundation	as	a	critical	actor	in	these	fields	whose	formulations	have	been	
widely	influential	in	shaping	the	political	economy	of	development	and	its	discourses,	but	
whose	activities	and	development	interventions	have	been	subjected	to	relatively	limited	
critical	scholarly	inquiry	to	date.		
Our	analysis	of	the	BMGF’s	discourses	relating	to	‘climate-smart’	agriculture	in	
particular,	can	be	understood	in	the	context	of	‘gender	and	climate-	smart’	approaches	to	
development	(Arora-Jonsson	2011;	Chant	and	Sweetman	2012),	to	which	philanthrocapitalist	
‘forgiveness’	industries	(Kim	2018,	p.	56)	are	central	(see	also	Roy	2012;	Mitchell	and	Sparke,	
2016).	Drawing	on	concepts	and	approaches	developed	by	Black,	postcolonial	and	Marxist	
feminists	including	intersectionality,	racial	capitalism,	social	reproduction,	and	reproductive	
justice	(see	for	example	hooks	1982;	Gilmore	2002;	Mohanty	2003;	Ross	2011;	Bhattacharya	
2017),
1	we	argue	that	‘gender-smart’	BMGF	discourses	on	fertility	and	agriculture	mobilise	
racialised	and	gendered	representations	of	women	as	‘risky	yet	reformable’	subjects	(Young	
2010,	p.	41).		
BMGF	discourses	responsibilise	women	in	low	income	households	in	Sub-	Saharan	Africa	
and	South	Asia	for	not	only	managing	their	fields	and	families	but,	in	the	process,	adapting	to	
and	mitigating	climate	change.	As	figures	of	resilience,	‘charged	with	converting	poverty	into	
enterprise’	(Roy	2012,	p.	136),	racialised	women	are	represented	as	both	‘productive	bodies’	
having	infinitely	elastic	capacities	for	labour	(Wilson	2011)	and	as	dangerously	reproductive	and	
resource-consuming	bodies	needing	to	be	controlled	–	by	extension,	‘disposable	bodies’	who	
can	be	subject	to	new	extensions	of	the	toxification	and	displacement	inaugurated	by	the	
Green	Revolution	(Moore	2015:19)	which	are	being	articulated	along	new	technological	
frontiers	(Eddens	2018).	We	suggest	therefore	that	these	public	constructions	are	consistent	
with	and	reinforce	broader	populationist	production,	management	and	gendered	disciplining	of	
racialised	lives	(bio-populationism)	but	also	the	spatially	and	racially	differentiated	promotion	
of	technologies	linked	with	uncertain	effects,	ill	health,	toxification	and	even	death	which	can	
be	described	as	‘necro-populationism.’		
The	Bill	and	Melinda	Gates	Foundation	and	Trust		
The	Bill	and	Melinda	Gates	Foundation	has	long	been	the	world’s	largest	foundation,	with	an	
endowment	of	more	than	40	billion	USD	funded	through	private	donations	and	through	the	
Foundation	Trust	(Gates	Foundation,	‘Who	We	Are’,	n.d.).	BMGF	donates	more	than	any	other	
country	or	foundation	to	global	health	and	is	the	fifth	largest	donor	to	agricultural	development	
(OECD	2017,	p.	2).	The	Foundation	operates	by	working	with	grantees	and	partners	through	five	
programmes:	global	health,	global	development,	global	growth	and	opportunity,	a	United	
States	division	and	global	policy	and	advocacy	(Gates	Who	we	are	n.d.).	The	Foundation	is	thus	
a	critical	actor	within	the	global	development	landscape,	funding	UN	organisation	such	as	the	
International	Fund	for	Agricultural	Development	(IFAD),	World	Health	Organisation	(WHO)	and	
United	Nations	Population	Fund	(UNPF)	and	other	major	development	partnerships	and	events	
such	as	the	research	consortium	the	Consultative	Group	on	International	Agricultural	Research	
(CGIAR)	and	the	London	Summit	on	Family	Planning	(Gates	Who	we	are	n.d.).	The	foundation	
works	in	more	than	one	hundred	countries	(Gates	‘Foundation	Fact	Sheet’).		
Scholars	have	critiqued	the	Foundation’s	lack	of	transparency	(Birn	2014;	Gideon	and	
Porter	2016;	McGoey	2015;	Thompson	2017);	its	self-generated	legitimacy	as	a	result	of	the	
magnitude	of	resources	it	wields	(Harman,	2016);	and	the	fact	that	few	resources	are	directly	
channelled	to	organisations	working	in	Sub-Saharan	Africa	and	South	Asia,	the	Foundation’s	
main	areas	of	focus	(GRAIN	2014;	Birn	2014,	p.	1;	Lancet	2009).	For	example,	research	by	the	
not-for-profit	organisation	GRAIN	found	that	in	2014	nearly	74%	of	the	669	million	USD	
channelled	by	the	Foundation	to	agricultural	NGOs	went	to	US-based	organisations,	with	only	
4%	of	these	funds	going	to	African	NGOs	(GRAIN	2014).		
However,	independent	evaluation	and	scholarly	critique	of	the	Foundation	remains	
relatively	rare	(exceptions	are	Harman	2016;	McGoey	2015;	Thompson	2017;	Kovacs	2011),	
arguably	because	researchers	are	reluctant	to	risk	loss	of	access	to	BMGF	funds.	Similarly,	
critical	media	coverage	of	the	Foundation	is	also	sparse,	and	some	major	media	outlets	receive	
extensive	Foundation	support	(e.g.	the	Guardian’s	Global	Development	section)2	(Harman	
2016,	p.	360).	As	a	result,	we	have	found	it	necessary	to	also	draw	upon	reports	by	civil	society	
organisations	on	the	Foundation’s	work	along-	side	financial	disclosure	information	(e.g.	ACB	
2018;	Global	Justice	Now	2016;	SEC	2015).		
Despite	obstacles	to	obtaining	transparent,	independent	and	scholarly	information,	
these	sources	have	effectively	exposed	and	highlighted	the	contradictions	of	extensive	tax	
avoidance	by	Microsoft	on	a	scale	which	far	exceeds	the	Trust’s	charitable	donations	(Global	
Justice	Now	2016).	The	latter	have	been	characterised	as	‘philanthrocapitalism’:	transferring	
resources	from	public	use	and	oversight	into	the	hands	of	‘billionaires	who	know	best’	(McGoey	
2015)	while	simultaneously	mobilising	public	sector	funds	for	private	profit	(Thompson	2017).	
As	scholars	argue,	the	‘gifts’	of	these	‘”forgiveness”	industries’	(Kim	2018	p.	56)	bind	receivers	
into	relations	of	indebtedness	(Nguyen	2012)	as	part	of	the	violent	relations	of	debt	
engendered	by	racial	capitalism	(Kim	2018).		
One	further	tension	in	the	political	economy	of	the	Foundation	also	bears	on	our	analysis	of	
BMGF	discourses.	This	relates	to	the	significant	wealth	the	BMGF	generates	through	
investments	in	fossil	fuel,	pharmaceutical,	agribusiness,	food	retail	and	chemical	industries	
responsible	for	creating	some	of	the	climate-	and	human	health	problems	the	Foundation	then	
purports	to	address	(Birn	2014,	p.	14;	Harman	2016,	p.	357;	SEC	Filings	2015).	Specifically,	
Foundation	Trust	investments	include	US	retail	giant	Wal-Mart,	extractive	industries	(Barrick	
Gold,	BHP	Billiton,	Freeport	McMoran,	Glencore,	Rio	Tinto,	Vale	and	Vedanta),	agribusinesses	
(Archer	Daniels	Midland,	Kraft,	Mondelez	International,	Nestle	and	Unilever),	chemical	and	
pharmaceutical	companies	(BASF,	Dow	Chemicals,	GlaxoSmithKline,	Novartis,	and	Pfizer),	
beverage	com-	panies	(Coca-Cola,	Diageo,	Pepsico	and	SABMiller)	and	construction	giant	
Caterpillar	and	BAE	Systems	(an	arms	exporter)	(Global	Justice	Now	2016,	p.	22).	While	some	of	
these	initial	investments
3	have	been	shed,	including	unannounced	divestment	of	1	billion	USD	
in	fossil	fuel	investments,	the	Foundation	maintains	significant	investments	in	fossil	fuels	and	
carbon	emit-	ting	industries	(SEC	Filings	2015).		
In	addition	to	generating	wealth	from	investments	in	the	industries	causing	the	climate,	
environmental	and	human	health	problems	targeted	by	BMGF	philanthropic	work,	the	
Foundation	also	re-invests	this	wealth	into	‘solutions’	developed	by	some	of	the	same	
pharmaceutical	and	agribiotechnological	industries.	The	paradoxical	circularity	of	these	
investments	is	well	exposed	by	attention	to	the	agriculture-reproduction	nexus	highlighted	in	
the	introduction.	In	particular,	pesticides	produced	by	chemical	industries	and	used	in	
agriculture	can	act	as	endocrine	disrupting	chemicals	(EDCs)	linked	with	reproductive	health	
problems,	increased	rates	of	breast	cancer,	changes	to	immune	systems	and	
neurodevelopmental	and	growth	problems	in	children	(WHO,	‘EDCs’;	Bergman	et	al.	2013;	
Combarnous	2017).	And	yet	agricultural	technologies	such	as	genetically	modified	seeds,	
chemical	fertilisers	and	certain	pesticides	are	part	of	the	suite	of	technologies	the	BMGF	4 
supports	under	its	Climate-Smart	Agriculture	work.	Not	only	are	such	investments	
contradictory,	but	they	emphasise	technological	‘quick	fixes’	which	obscure	and	detract	
attention	from	deep-rooted	political	and	structural	causes	of	inequalities	and	the	intensification	
of	these	processes	with	the	growing	centrality	of	the	private	sector	in	development	(Gideon	
and	Porter	2016.		
BMGF	has	financed	the	promotion	of	technologies	and	procedures	that	have	uncertain	
benefits,	unknown	effects	and	in	some	cases	have	been	proven	unsafe	(see	for	example	
Vashisht	and	Puliyel	2012).	BMGF	drug	trials	have	been	found	to	be	unethical	(Sarojini	and	
Shenoi,	2010)	and	the	Foundation	has	rebranded	existing	technologies	in	spite	of	their	known	
dangers,	as	in	the	case	of	the	injectable	contraceptive	Depo-Provera	(relaunched	as	Sayana	
Press)	(Hendrixson	2018;	Bendix	et	al.,	2019).	As	we	will	see	in	the	next	section,	analysing	BMGF	
discourses	in	relation	to	agricultural	and	fertility-related	technologies	and	associated	
behavioural	interventions	exposes	some	of	the	otherwise	obscured	relationships	between	
contemporary	philanthropy,	racial	capitalism	(Robinson	2000;	Melamed	2015)
5	and	
(re)animated	populationism.	We	suggest	that	an	analysis	of	Foundation	discourses	is	
particularly	critical	given	the	magnitude	of	resources	the	BMGF	wields	and	the	related	dispersal	
of	accountability	generated	through	the	Foundation’s	wealth	and	through	the	promotion	of	
third-party,	corporate	technologies.		
BMGF	climate-smart	agriculture	(CSA)	initiatives		
Climate-smart	agriculture	(CSA)	combines	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation	with	agricultural	
intensification	(World	Bank	2011;	2015;	2017;	FAO	2013;	Taylor	2018,	p.	2)	and	has	been	widely	
taken	up	by	international	organisations	and	private	foundations	such	as	Gates,	with	a	focus	on	
the	African	Region	(World	Bank	2015;	also	cited	in	Taylor	2018,	p.	2).	BMGF	frames	its	climate-	
smart	agriculture	initiatives	as	bringing	new	Green	Revolution	approaches	to	Sub-Saharan	
Africa,	where	‘some	Green	Revolution	approaches	were	tried	but	failed’	(Gates	Foundation,	
Agricultural	development,	n.	d.).	BMGF	locates	its	support	in	the	context	of	concerns	about	
population	growth,	as	in	this	description	of	changes	since	the	first	Green	Revolution	or	what	
Patel	has	called	the	‘long	Green	Revolution’	(Patel	2013):		
Meanwhile,	in	the	intervening	years,	[since	the	first	Green	Revolution]	population	
growth,	rising	incomes,	dwindling	natural	resources,	and	a	changing	climate	have	caused	food	
prices	to	rise	and	agricultural	productivity	has	once	again	become	strained	(Gates	Foundation,	
‘Agricultural	Development’,	n.d.).	Because	CSA	works	simply	as	a	guiding	framework,	any	
activity	which	contributes	to	any	of	its	three	principal	goals	–	reducing	greenhouse	gas	
(mitigation),	promoting	resilience	(adaptation)	and	sustainable	intensification	–	can	be	termed	
‘climate-smart’	(Taylor	2018,	p.	7).	Thus,	older	technoscientific	approaches	to	food	production	
which	promote	mechanisation,	hybrid	seed	use	and	the	use	of	chemical	inputs	to	drive	
increased	output	continue	to	be	propagated	by	the	Gates	Foundation	in	Sub-Saharan	Africa	and	
South	Asia	(Taylor	2018,	p.	7,	World	Bank	2015;	Patel	2013)	despite	extensive	critiques	about	
their	effectiveness	(Eddens	2017;	Serrano	2018;	Tandon,	2010;	Glaeser	2010;	Patel	2013;	
Gengenbach	et	al.	2017;	Schurman	2017;	Holt-Gim_enez	2008).		
Critics	have	highlighted	that	even	while	ostensibly	aimed	at	supporting	smallholders,	
CSA	lacks	participatory,	farmer-led	approaches	and	tends	to	benefit	corporate	agribusiness	
(Whitfield	2015;	also	cited	in	Taylor	2018,	p.	3).	This	is	not	surprising	given	the	corporate	and	
food	industry	involvement	in	CSA	initiatives	themselves	–	for	example,	Pepsi,	Monsanto	and	
Syngenta,	along	with	other	food	and	agriculture	industry	giants,	play	a	central	role	in	the	global	
World	Business	Council	‘Climate-Smart	Agriculture’	working	group	which	defines	and	promotes	
the	CSA	framing	(Taylor	2018,	p.	8;	World	Business	Council	for	Sustainable	Development).		
Genetic	engineering	in	particular	has	been	positioned	by	proponents	as	key	to	managing	
a	‘booming	world	population’	while	‘mitigating	climate	change	impacts’	(Ricroch	and	Henard-
Damave	2015)	by	engineering	seed	to	increase	production	volumes,	crop	yields,	nutrient	values	
and	climate-change	resistant	features	of	particular	crops	(i.e.	drought	resistance,	salt	tolerance	
etc)	(World	Bank	2017;	IFAD	2011;	Thompson	2017).	BMGF	CSA	initiatives	strongly	pro-	mote	
genetic	engineering,	agribiotechnologies	and	their	associated	inputs	through	support	for	
research,	development	and	promotion	of	hybrid	and	genetically	modified	seeds	and	chemical	
fertilisers	and	pesticides	(Gengenbach	et	al.	2017;	Schurman	2017).	BMGF	has	also	lobbied	
extensively	for	the	introduction	and	strengthening	of	intellectual	property	regimes	on	which	
genetic-	ally	modified	seeds	and	their	associated	inputs	rely,
6	even	while	critics	have	
highlighted	the	racial	logics	((Eddens	2017;	Goldberg-Hiller	and	Silva	2015)	and	intensification	
of	inequalities	(Whitt	1998)	associated	with	genetic	appropriation	and	modification	of	plants	
and	seeds.	Biotechnologies	such	as	GM	seeds	and	their	associated	petroleum-based
7	inputs	
such	as	fertilisers
8	form	the	bedrock	of	the	BMGF	CSA	approach	–investments	which	are	likely	
to	favour	large	transnational	corporations	(Global	Justice	Now	2016;	Thompson	2017),	extend	
the	reach	of	petrochemical	and	pharmaceutical	markets	(Otero	2013)	and	enhance	
agglomeration	in	seed	and	agricultural	input	industries	(Bonny	2014;	UNCTAD	2006;	Fuglie	et	al.	
2012).		
In	addition	to	their	racialised	history	(Eddens	2017;	Serran	2018)	and	the	central	role	
GM	technologies	play	in	processes	of	accumulation	and	agglomeration	(Schrager	and	Suryanata	
2018),	questions	have	been	raised	about	their	overblown	scientific	claims	(Gengenbach	et	al.	
2017;	Schurman	and	Munro	2010),	lack	of	independent	biosafety	data	and	inappropriateness	
for	smallholder	farmers	(ACB	2018).	For	example,	BMGF	is	promoting	Monsanto-	developed	
genetically	engineered,	insecticide-producing	(BT-tolerant)	and	drought-tolerant	–	so-called	
‘stacked’	–	maize	varieties	as	part	of	its	solutions	to	climate-change	in	Southern	Africa	(Lynas	
2017;	Gates	Foundation	2008).	However,	genetically	modified	insecticide-producing	maize	has,	
in	South	Africa,	led	to	pest	resistance	and	inefficacy	(Van	den	Berg	et	al.	2013)	and	yet	
Monsanto	has	‘donated’	this	variety	(MON810)	to	the	BMGF-co-financed	Water	Efficient	Maize	
for	Africa	(WEMA)	project.	These	kinds	of	‘donations’	represent	another	example	of	BMGF-
support	for	inappropriate
9	and	ineffective	technologies	(ACB	2018)	that	facilitate	accumulation	
through	the	sale	of	supposedly	‘pro-poor	technologies’	(Ignatova	2017).		
Furthermore,	BMGF	promotion	of	Green	Revolution	tools	in	Africa	and	South	Asia	raise	
major	concerns	based	on	experiences	elsewhere	of	regions	with	large	concentrations	of	GM	
corn	and	soy	monocrops.	While	the	relation-	ships	between	the	use	of	genetically	engineered	
seeds	and	pesticides	can	vary	by	seed-type	(e.g.	Perry	et	al.	2016),	massive	fertiliser	and	
pesticide	inputs	associated	with	GM	corn	and	soy	have	been	linked	to	displacement,	infertility,	
birth	defects,	increased	cancer	rates	and	other	health	and	environmental	problems	in	
Argentina,	Paraguay,	Brazil	and	the	United	States	(Serrano	2018;	Lapegna	2014;	Otero	and	
Lapegna	2016;	Motta	2016;	Leguizamón	2016;	Caceres	2015;	Alain	2017;	Davies	2018;	Murphy	
2013;	Benbrook	2016).	Ezquerro-Can~ete	(2016)	calls	these	processes	of	‘accumulation	by	
fumigation	and	dispossession’	–	forms	of	toxification,	slow	death	and	corporeal	attrition	that	
reduce	populations	through	ill	health,	infertility	and	furtive	modes	of	displacement.	That	these	
harms	are	not	always	directly	attributable	to	agribiotechnologies	results	from	a	combination	of	
scientific	uncertainty,	the	abandonment	of	precautionary	principles	(Seager	2003),	‘undone	
science’	(Frickel	et	al.	2010)	and	the	‘spatiotemporal	ambiguities’	(Davies	2018,	p.	2)	of	toxic	
pollution	itself.	While	the	exact	human	health	and	environmental	impacts	of	BMGF-	promoted	
Green	Revolution	tools	require	further	investigation,	the	documented	impacts	of	these	same	
technologies	used	in	other	locations	point	toward	the	Foundations’	reliance	on	what	have	been	
shown	to	be	dangerous	or	uncertain	‘solutions’	to	both	production	and	reproduction.	More	
research	is	thus	needed	to	investigate	systematically	how	this	BMGF	approach	to	CSA,	framed	
through	dubious	and	contradictory	technoscience,	is	being	mobilised	in	particular	contexts.		
Gender-	and	Climate-Smart	agriculture		
Climate-smart	agriculture	initiatives	are	critically	also	‘gender-smart’	interventions	(Arora-
Jonsson	2011;	Chant	and	Sweetman	2012),	and	analysis	of	BMGF	materials	shows	that	the	
Foundation	represents	itself	as	intervening	to	change	the	behaviour	of	poor	households	and	
specifically	poor	women	in	the	Global	South,	to	make	them	more	responsive	to	new	or	not-so-
new	technological	fixes.	This	is	explicit	in	the	case	of	descriptions	of	BMGF	agri-	culture	
programmes	that	aim	to	‘ultimately	help	farmers	develop	more	profit-oriented	behaviour	
which	are	necessary	to	enhance	adoption	rate,	production	and	food	security	in	the	long	run’	
(Ghimire	et	al.	2015,	p.	35,	emphasis	added);	it	is	also	implicit	within	the	framing	of	BMGF	
Family	Planning	initiatives	as	seeking	to	‘address	reasons	for	[contraception]	non-	use,	with	a	
focus	on	improving	acceptance	and	continued	use	among	priority	user	groups’	(Gates	
Foundation,	‘What	We	Do’,	n.d.,	emphasis	added).	In	this	way,	BMGF	discourse	represents	
women	in	low	income	households	in	Sub-	Saharan	Africa	and	South	Asia	as	potentially	
entrepreneurial	adopters	of	technologies	aimed	at	increasing	agricultural	productivity	and	
managing	fertility	as	ways	of	adapting	and	mitigating	climate	change.		
These	references	to	‘improving	acceptance’	and	‘profit-oriented	behaviour’	(Gates	
Foundation,	‘What	We	Do’,	n.d.)	serve	to	emphasise	that	the	project	of	producing	neoliberal	
subjectivities	geared	to	self-improvement,	efficiency	and	profit-making	and,	critically,	toward	
producing	consumers	for	new	technologies	is	inseparable	from	BMGF	activities	promoting	the	
‘discovery,	development,	and	distribution	of	new	technologies’	(Gates	Foundation,	‘What	We	
Do’,	n.d.)	and	thus	the	expansion	of	markets	for	the	corporate	actors	with	whom	the	BMGF	is	
closely	associated.		
A	term	originally	put	forward	by	the	World	Bank	in	2009,	‘climate-smart	agriculture’	was	
closely	connected	to	the	Bank’s	strategy	of	‘Gender	Equality	as	Smart	Economics’	(World	Bank	
2006;	2011;	Chant	and	Sweetman	2012).	These	‘smart’	discourses	specifically	frame	change	as	a	
positive	sum	game	in	which	climate	change	adaptation	and	mitigation	and	women’s	
empowerment,	respectively,	are	constructed	as	consistent	with,	and	indeed	as	contributing	
toward,	increased	productivity	and	economic	growth	(Taylor	2018,	p.	5;	Chant	and	Sweetman	
2012;	Elson	2012,	Roy	2012).	As	BMGF	formulates	it:		
When	women	farmers	are	meaningfully	included	in	agricultural	development	opportunities,	not	
only	do	farms	become	more	productive	but	adoption	of	new	technologies	increases	and	overall	
family	health	improves.		
Evidence	shows	that	if	women	farmers	across	the	developing	world	had	the	same	access	as	men	
do	to	resources	such	as	land,	improved	seed	varieties,	new	technologies,	and	better	farming	
practices,	yields	could	increase	by	as	much	as	30	percent	per	household	and	countries	could	see	
an	increase	of	2.5–4	percent	in	agricultural	output.		
Women	have	also	been	shown	to	be	more	likely	than	men	to	reinvest	income	in	the	health	of	
children	and	other	family	members	and	in	a	more	varied	and	nutritious	family	diet	(Gates	
Foundation,	‘Creating	Gender	Responsive	Agricultural	Development	Programmes’,	n.d.).		
Within	the	‘Smart	Economics’	framework	utilised	in	promoting	BMGF	agriculture	programmes,	
gendered	inequalities,	both	material	and	ideological,	which	make	women	‘more	likely	than	men	
to	reinvest	income	in	the	health	of	children	and	other	family	members’	are	not	questioned,	but	
rather	celebrated	and	instrumentalised	(Wilson	2011;	Murphy	2017).	At	the	same	time,	
emphasis	on	addressing	women’s	‘access	to	improved	seeds,	better	techniques	and	
technologies,	and	markets’	to	increase	their	productivity	marginalizes	gendered	questions	of	
land	rights,	intra-household	inequalities,	and	the	political	economy	of	hunger	(Agarwal	2010;	
Barrientos	et	al.	1999;	Sen	1997).	Instead,	the	Foundation	argues	that	women	farmers		‘are	the	
keys	for	improving	their	and	their	children’s	nutrition:	when	women	are	better	nourished,	they	
enjoy	better	health	and	are	more	productive	child	caregivers	and	labourers’	(Gates	Foundation,	
Agricultural	Development,	n.d.).	Thus,	the	BMGF	presents	its	agricultural	strategy	as	directly	
linked	to	the	intensification	of	the	social	reproductive	and	productive	labour	of	poor	women	in	
Sub-Saharan	Africa	and	Asia,	a	focus	which	echoes	and	complements	the	logic	of	the	BMGF-led	
Family	Planning	2020	agenda	(Hendrixson	2018)	wherein	‘investing	in	reproductive	health	is	
smart	economics’	in	part	because	lower	fertility	rates	increase	‘female	labour	supply’	(Grepin	
and	Klugman	2013).		
The	productive	and	reproductive	elements	of	this	story	are	brought	together	in	a	2008	speech	
by	BMGF	CEO	Catherine	Bertini:		
Consider	the	daily	life	of	a	woman	in	an	African	village.	She	rises	before	the	sun.	She	spends	
many	hours	laboring	in	the	fields...	She	does	all	this	while	caring	for	her	children.	She	may,	like	
many	women,	work	all	day	with	a	baby	strapped	to	her	back.	Then	she	is	responsible	for	
preparing	her	family’s	meals,	which	means	she	must	gather	firewood	and	collect	water...	And	
finally,	at	the	end	of	the	day,	she	will	feed	her	husband,	she	will	feed	her	children—and	then	she	
will	eat	last,	from	whatever	is	left	...	.	Some	days	that	means	she	doesn’t	eat	anything	at	all.	.	
Eighty	percent	of	smallholder	farmers	in	Africa	are	women.	Sixty	percent	of	smallholder	farmers	
in	Asia	are	women.	They	carry	the	burden	of	feeding	most	of	the	world	...	We	demand	so	much	
from	the	women	who	grow	the	developing	world’s	food.	We	should	give	them	support,	to	help	
them	shoulder	the	burden.	That	would	be	fair.	It	would	also	be	smart	(ODI	2008,	pp.	5–8).		
As	with	the	broader	Smart	Economics	discourse,	this	remarkable	passage	offers	no	possibility	
that	the	global	gendered	and	racialised	division	of	labour	which	ensures	that	women	small	
farmers	in	Africa	and	Asia	not	only	combine	productive	and	reproductive	labour	for	their	
households	but	‘carry	the	burden	of	feeding	most	of	the	world’	could	–	or	should	–	change.	
Rather	it	embraces	a	racialised	vision	of	these	women	as	innately	hyperindustrious	
entrepreneurial	subjects	who	should	be	‘helped’,	as	‘investable	life’	(Murphy	2017)	to	‘shoulder	
the	burden’	more	efficiently.	The	phrase	‘we	demand	so	much’	with	its	direct	appeal	to	white	
Global	North	subjectivities	implicitly	acknowledges	racialised	global	injustice	but	also	underlines	
its	apparent	inevitability.	This	approach	is	consistent	with	current	sustainable	development	
narratives	in	which	‘resilience’	in	the	global	South	must	be	strengthened	in	the	interests	of	
socio-spatial	containment:	the	aspirational	trope	of	‘catching	up’	has	been	abandoned	in	favour	
of	a	celebration	of	permanent	global	inequality	(Duffield	2005),	naturalising	global	agricultural	
divisions	of	labour	(McMichael	2009,	pp.	148)	and	other	socio-spatial	inequalities	(Taylor	2018,	
pp.	9;	Rodger	Fleming	and	Jankovic	2011;	Hulme	2011).		
In	a	context	of	climate	change,	the	poor	are	further	responsibilised	for	the	
consequences,	and	for	mitigation	and	adaption:		
In	an	era	of	increasingly	scarce	resources	and	growing	impact	of	climate	change,	we	encourage	
farmers	to	embrace	and	adopt	sustainable	practices	that	help	them	grow	more	with	less	land,	
water,	fertilizer,	and	other	costly	inputs	while	preserving	natural	resources	for	future	
generations	(Gates	Foundation,	‘Agricultural	Development’,	n.d.).		
	
Via	a	reformed	use	of	Green	Revolution	technologies,	BMGF	CSA	dis-	courses	continue	to	
promote	a	capitalist	agrarian	modernisation	programme
10	geared	towards	sustaining	the	
existing	distribution	of	resources.	In	tandem	with	global	‘family	planning’	policies,	CSA	
initiatives	arguably	work	to	shore	up	spatial	inequalities	and	borders	and	contain	racialised	
populations	(Wilson,	2017)	even	while	sustaining	and	expanding	capital	accumulation	within	
‘planetary	boundaries’	(Duffield	and	Evans	2011).	As	in	earlier	phases	of	colonial	and	Cold	War	
intervention
11	racialised	representations	of	‘women’	in	the	global	South,	their	‘disposable’	
labour	(Wright	2006)	and	‘dangerous’	sexualities	(Briggs	2002;	Switzer	2013)	become	the	
essentialised	locus	of	this	strategy	and	the	embodied	violence	it	entails.		
These	processes	can	be	viewed	through	the	lenses	of	reproductive	and	environmental	
justice	–	approaches	which	stand	in	stark	contrast	to	BMGF	framings	of	reproductive	rights	and	
agricultural	productivism	as	granting	choices	to	individuals	within	a	neoliberal	framework.	
Instead,	demands	for	reproductive	and	environmental	justice	make	visible	the	broader	
structural	forces	–	economic,	political	and	social	–	which	deny	people	of	colour,	and	women	of	
colour	in	particular,	control	over	their	bodies	and	over	wider	processes	of	social	reproduction.		
The	concepts	of	reproductive	and	environmental	justice	both	emerged	from	the	
struggles	of	women	of	colour	and	indigenous	women	in	response	to	racialised	experiences	such	
as	those	of	environmental	racism	(Chioma	Steady	2009;	Garvey	2011),	forcible	sterilization	and	
coercive	promotion	of	unsafe	contraceptives	in	the	US.	Reproductive	justice	has	been	defined	
as	‘a	shift	for	women	advocating	for	control	of	their	bodies...to	a	broader	analysis	of	racial,	
economic,	cultural	and	structural	constraints’	(Ross	2011).	While	there	have	been	attempts	to	
appropriate	and	eviscerate	these	concepts	(Luna	2011;	Sasser	2018),	in	their	original	form	they	
can	effectively	encompass	and	connect	the	harmful	effects	of	long-acting	hormonal	
contraceptives	promoted	by	the	BMGF’s	family	planning	initiatives	and	the	promotion	of	unsafe	
and	uncertain	Green	Revolution	technologies	associated	with	the	Foundation’s	approach	to	
agriculture	which	have	been	linked	to	endocrine	disruption,	toxification	and	dispossession.		
	
Necro-populationism		
Populationist	strategies	focus	on	targeting	the	number	of	humans	on	the	planet	(demo-
populationism),	the	containment	and	shaping	of	populations	in	relation	to	particular	spaces	
(geo-populationism)	and	the	management	of	life	itself	(bio-populationism)	(Bhatia	et	al.,	2019).	
As	we	have	argued,	the	Gates	Foundation	represents	its	own	work	through	the	lenses	of	these	
dis-	tinct	but	often	intersecting	forms	of	populationisms:	directly	managing	human	population	
numbers	through	the	promotion	of	reproductive	technologies	(demo-populationism),	targeting	
particular	areas	of	the	global	South	as	laboratories	for	new	and	old	technologies	in	order	to	
sustain	and	extend	racialised	socio-spatial	inequalities,	displacements	and	dispossessions	(geo-	
populationism)	and	promoting	desirable,	market-oriented,	‘productive’	behaviours	and	
subjectivities	as	key	to	what	constitutes	a	valuable	life	(bio-	populationism)	The	notions	of	
‘improved	acceptance’	and	‘profit	oriented	behaviour’	we	observed	in	BMGF	discourses	are	
consistent	with	a	reflexive,	antiquated	definition	of	displacement	as	‘to	rid	oneself	of’	
(Dictionary.com)	–	which	we	might	locate	at	the	intersections	of	demo-,	geo-	and	bio-
populationism	in	relation	to	ridding	oneself	of	dangerous	fertility	and	of	outmoded	habits	of	
survival	or	‘unproductive’	agriculture.		
Further,	BMGF	CSA	initiatives	mobilise	demo-populationist	framings	of	‘embodied	
environmental	responsibility’	in	which	women’s	bodies	and	labour	help	to	mitigate	climate	
change	and	population	pressures	(Sasser	2018,	18),	as	well	as	being	implicated	in	the	geo-
populationist	degradation	and	toxification	of	landscapes	devoted	to	industrial	food	production	
(Moore	2015).		
Analysing	BMGF	discourses	relating	to	both	family	planning	and	CSA	initiatives,	we	
suggest,	has	in	fact	helped	to	expose	a	grammar	of	multiple	displacements	operating	through	
BMGF	discourses	wherein:	technological	solutions	displace	attempts	to	address	the	unequal	
distribution	of	toxic	loads;	philanthropic	actors	disperse	accountability	through	wealth-
generated	legitimacy,	contradictory	investments	and	corporate	partnerships;	and	a	focus	on	
individual	choices	and	potential	for	behavioural	change	occludes	the	extraction	of	value	from	
racialised	women’s	labour	in	mitigating	and	managing	climate	change.		
However,	while	we	can	locate	BMGF	discourse	in	relation	to	these	different	forms	of	
populationist	regulation	of	human	numbers,	socio-spatial	containment	and	life	management,	
the	multiple	modes	through	which	BMGF	displaces	accountability	highlight	aspects	of	
contemporary	populationism	that	are	systematically	destroying	–	rather	than	producing,	
managing	and	disciplining	–	racialised	lives.	Specifically,	the	elements	we	are	attempting	to	
delineate	here	relate	to	the	‘production	and	exploitation	of	group-differentiated	vulnerabilities	
to	premature	death,	in	distinct	yet	densely	interconnected	political	geographies’	which	Gilmore	
identifies	as	central	to	racism	(Gilmore	2002:	261)	as	they	are	operating	within	contemporary	
population-	ism.	In	this	case,	BMGF’s	promotion	of	Green	Revolution	technologies	emit-	ting	
endocrine	disrupting	chemicals	and	reproductive	technologies	linked	with	adverse	health	
effects	–	technologies	and	processes	inducing	multiple	forms	of	displacement	through	rising	
costs	and	indebtedness,	toxification	and	other	forms	of	violence,	is	marked	by	inexorable	
tendencies	to	dispossession,	biological	disruption	and	death.	We	would	describe	this	as	necro-
populationism.	Drawing	on	Mbembe’s	notion	of	necropolitics	(Mbembe	2003)	which	
reconceptualises	contemporary	forms	of	power	as	exercised	through	the	creation	of	‘zones	of	
death’	structured	through	racial	and	colonial	violence	(Smith	and	Vasudevan	2017;	Weheliye	
2014),	necro-populationism	operates	via	systematic	deaths	of	those	who	are	not	simply	
excluded	or	‘let	die’	but	targeted	for	specific	forms	of	violence,	and	sudden	or	slow	deaths,	
which	themselves	underwrite	and	sustain	continuing	capital	accumulation	through	the	
promotion	of	new	or	not-so-new	technologies,	whose	violent	effects	remain	largely	obscured.		
Necro-populationism	exposes	the	colonial	relations	of	violence	and	debt	immanent	to	
these	philanthropic	‘gifts’	of	unsafe,	uncertain	and	ineffective	technologies	–	a	debt	which	
enforces	‘a	necropolitical	social	hierarchy’,	extending	the	‘suffocating	embrace	of	imperial	and	
gendered	racial	violence’	(Kim	2018,	p.	56-57)		
Among	those	subject	to	necro-populationist	interventions	are	Adivasi	and	Dalit	women	
who	have	died	in	mass	sterilisation	camps	in	India	(Sama	et	al.	2014),	and	those	targeted	as	
‘acceptors’	of	unsafe	and	potentially	debilitating	contraceptive	technology	(Hendrixson,	2018),	
all	within	the	framework	of	the	BMGF’s	FP2020	strategy	(ibid.),	and	those	smallholders	in	Latin	
America	and	elsewhere	enduring	the	slow	deaths	through	environmental	degradation,	
endocrine	disruption,	rising	costs	and	multiple	dispossessions	(Ezquerro-	Can~ete,	2016;	
C_aceres	2015)	associated	with	the	agricultural	technologies	promoted	by	the	Foundation.		
Neoliberal,	philanthrocapitalist	repackaging	and	climatisation	of	the	Malthusian	
disequilibrium	between	human	fertility	and	agricultural	productivity	is	inextricably	bound	to	
this	racialised	and	gendered	necro-populationism.	Colonial	framings	of	appropriately	
productive	subjects	and	spaces	intertwine	with	Malthusian	fears	of	racialised	population	
growth	and	running	out	of	food,	now	intensified	and	reanimated	through	their	association	with	
the	threats	of	climate	change	(Hartmann	and	Barajas-Roman	2009).	By	dispersing	
accountability	through	self-generated	legitimacy,	opaque	relationships	with	corporate	actors	
and	reliance	on	‘scientific	uncertainty’,	institutions	such	as	the	Bill	and	Melinda	Gates	
Foundation	sustain	this	deathly	dynamic	which	under-	pins	global	capital	accumulation	in	the	
era	of	climate	change.		
However,	necropolitical	analysis	and	the	closely	related	notion	of	‘bare	life’	
conceptualised	as	life	excluded	from	politics	and	devoid	of	rights	(Agamben,	1998)	have	also	
been	critiqued	for	their	tendency	to	elide	multiple	forms	of	resistance	in	contexts	of	exclusion	
from	full	humanity,	‘the	ways	in	which	the	politics	of	life	as	bare	life	is	disavowed/refused’	
(Madhok,	2018)	and	the	(re)	constitution	of	radical	collectivities	which	challenge	this	dynamic	
(Melamed,	2015).		
Critical	development	scholars	have	highlighted	the	disjunctures	between	development	
discourses	and	policies,	and	development	practice	which	is	negotiated	and	remade	by	multiple	
actors	(Mosse	2005),	a	notion	which	Fejerskov	(2018)	has	recently	explored	in	the	context	of	
BMGF	initiatives,	describing	how	state-level	development	workers	in	a	BMGF-funded	project	
promoting	women’s	ownership	of	land	in	Odisha,	India	substituted	the	BMGF	narrative	of	
women’s	agricultural	productivity	as	the	fuel	of	economic	growth	with	an	emphasis	on	the	
potential	for	transformation	in	women’s	social	status	(ibid.).	This	highlights	the	need	for	further	
research	into	the	ways	in	which	the	BMGF’s	global	policies	are	materialised,	spatialised,	
reproduced	and	reoriented	by	multiple	actors	in	local	contexts.		
However,	even	less	scholarly	attention	has	been	given	to	those	who	directly	counter	
and	resist	the	effects	of	‘gender	and	climate	smart’	initiatives	which	construct	them	as	
‘disposable’	-	such	as	those	landless,	Dalit	and	Adivasi	women	whose	protests	against	
sterilisation	camp	deaths	(Sama	et	al.	2014)12	and	coerced	hysterectomies	(Ananya	2017)	have	
fundamentally	disrupted	the	narratives	of	‘reproductive	choice	and	responsibility’	in	India	with	
questions	of	reproductive	justice;	or	those	who	are	resisting	toxification	by	fumigation	(e.g.	
Madres	de	Ituzaingo)	(Barri	2010)	and	the	false	technoscientific	fixes	of	climate-smart	
agriculture	(Taylor	2018).		
In	delineating,	as	we	have,	the	necro-populationism	embedded	within	the	logics	of	
philanthrocapitalist	investments	in	productive	and	reproductive	technologies,	we	must	also	
recognise	these	forms	of	resistance.This	requires	us	to	affirm,	as	Weheliye	(2014)	does	through	
an	engagement	with	Black	feminist	thought,	‘the	enduring	life	force	of	those	subjected	to	these	
regimes	of	rule’	and	the	subjects	who	make	visible	the	possibilities	for	social	trans-	formation	
against	and	beyond	the	dynamics	of	global	capital	accumulation.		
Notes		
1. We	refer	here	not	only	to	the	term	coined	by	Crenshaw	(1989)	but	to	the	much	longer	history	of	
praxis	developed	in	the	context	of	Black	women’s	struggles	in	relation	to	race,	gender,	class	and	
sexuality	in	North	America	and	Europe.	More	recently	feminist	critics	have	noted	the	
appropriation	of	the	concept	in	ways	which	displace	a	focus	on	racism	(Collins	and	Bilge	2016);	
legitimise	’funding	driven	agendas	...	for	the	Global	South’	(Menon	2015:41);	and	marginalise	
structural	critiques	of	capitalism	(Salem	2016).	 	
2. BMGF	funds	go	to	several	prominent	media	organisations,	such	as	the	Guardian,	ABC	and	All	Africa	
(Global	Justice	Now	2016,	p.	15).	Indeed,	such	funding	of	media	organisations	appears	to	be	
raising	increasing	ethical	questions	(see	American	Press	Institute	2016	for	more).	 	
3. For	example,	in	Arcos	Dorados,	a	major	franchise	holder	for	MacDonalds	(Global	Justice	Now	2016,	p.	
22).	 	
4. Recipients	of	BMGF	grants	in	this	area	include	the	International	Centre	for	Genetic	Engineering	and	
Biotechnology	(Trieste,	Italy)	(13	million	USD	over	nine	grants),	the	African	Agricultural	
Technology	Foundation	(100	million	USD)	and	The	Queensland	University	of	Technology	(14	
million	over	six	grants),	the	John	Innes	Centre	in	Norwich	(10	million	USD)	and	the	
Biotechnology	and	Biological	Sciences	Research	Council	(Swindon,	UK)	(8	million	USD)	(Gates	
‘Annual	Report’).	 	
5. Theorists	of	racial	capitalism	are	among	those	who	have	explained	how	capitalism	cannot	exist	
without	race	and	racialisation,	which	‘enshrines	the	inequalities	that	capitalism	requires’	
(Melamed	2015)	on	a	global	scale.	Of	particular	relevance	to	BMGF	discourses	is	Melamed’s	
insight	that	‘contemporary	racial	capitalism	deploys	liberal	and	multicultural	terms	of	inclusion	
to	value	and	devalue	forms	of	humanity	differentially	to	fit	the	needs	of	reigning	state-capital	
orders’	(Melamed	2015,	p.	77).	 	
6. In	particular,	in	Africa	through	the	Alliance	for	(a	Green	Revolution	in	Africa	(AGRA)	and	support	for	
the	International	Fertiliser	Development	Centre.	While	nominally	recognising	seed	diversity,	
AGRA	has	in	fact	lobbied	heavily	to	change	seed	policies	on	the	continent	(SEC	Filings	2015;	
Global	Justice	Now	2016).	In	2017,	AGRA	received	200	million	from	BMGF	“to	undertake	
agricultural	interventions	to	increase	the	productivity	and	incomes	of	at	least	30	million	
smallholder	farming	households,	and	use	data,	evidence	and	technical	capacity	to	support	
African	countries	to	trigger	and	sustain	inclusive	agriculture	transformation”	(Gates	Foundation,	
‘How	we	work’,	n.d.).	 ”	 	
7. Support	for	the	extension	of	the	“fertilizer	supply	chain	has	taken	place	through	 support	for	the	
African	Fertiliser	Agribusiness	Partnership	(AFAP)	through	grants	of	 at	least	25	million	USD.	 	
8. Hydrocarbons	form	the	basis	of	some	active	pesticide	ingredients,	while	petroleum-	 based	products	
are	also	used	to	facilitate	spraying.	 	
9. There	are	indications	that	the	genetically	modified	versions	of	maize	being	 promoted	in	Southern	
Africa	have	not	been	specifically	developed	for	smallholders	(ACB	2017)	and	thus	may	involve	
unsustainable	increases	in	input	costs	such	as	certified	seed,	synthetic	fertilizers	and	other	
infrastructure.	Not	only	may	such	technologies	be	costly	for	small	farmers	(Fernandez-Cornejo	
et	al.	2014,	p.	13:	Tandon	2010,	Bonny	2014):	in	India,	high	costs	have	been	associated	with	
farmer	indebtedness	and	subsequent	suicides	(Gru_ere	and	Sengupta	2011;	Desmond	2016).	 	
10. This	mirrors	the	critique	of	the	Gender	Equality	as	Smart	Economics	approach	which	similarly	
focuses	on	integrating	women	into	global	labour	markets	without	questioning	the	unequal	
terms	on	which	this	integration	occurs	(Chant	and	Sweetman	2012).	As	has	been	noted	
extensively,	it	is	the	unequal	terms	of	this	‘integration’,	rather	than	exclusion	from	global	
markets,	which	must	be	problematised	(Taylor	2018,	p.	16;	Stone	2007,	p.144;	Taylor	2013;	
Akram-	Lodhi	2013).	 	
11. US-backed	Green	Revolution	policies	during	the	Cold	War	era	had	the	explicit	goal	of	‘preventing	
a	Red	one’	in	South	Asia	and	Latin	America;	pesticides	were	simultaneously	used	in	agricultural	
and	military	programmes	(Verge_s,	2017).	They	were	accompanied	by	extensively	funded	
‘population	control’	programmes	(Rao,	1994)	which	were	similarly	informed	by	fears	of	a	racially	
embodied	threat	to	the	existing	distribution	of	resources,	while	intersecting	in	spatially	diverse	
ways	with	elite	nationalist	projects	relating	to	population	and	fertility	in	the	Global	South	(see	 
for	example	Hodges	2017;	Briggs	2002).	Both	these	forms	of	intervention	arguably	
extended	and	reworked	colonial	forms	of	populationism. Increased	sterilisation	abuses	
in	India	have	been	directly	linked	to	the	Indian	government’s	commitments	to	get	48	
million	more	women	to	use	contraception	by	2020	under	the	BMGF-led	global	Family	
Planning	2020	initiative	(Human	Rights	Watch	2012;	Singh	2014).		
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